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State of Minnesota v. Jeffrey Stein

Appellant was convicted of first-degree burglary based on circumstantial evidence and challenges the conviction based on the theory that the evidence was not sufficient to convict him of the offense charged.  The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

Appellant attended a party on the evening of June 1, 2005.  Several others who attended the party testified consistently as to what type of clothing the appellant was wearing that evening, specifically, jean shorts with visible plaid boxer shorts underneath, a black t-shirt over a white undershirt and a light colored baseball hat.  In addition, video surveillance at a bank ATM partially confirmed his clothing on the same night as the party.

In the early morning hours of June 2, 2005 following the party, a spree of burglaries took place within two hours and one mile of one another whereby three female victims called 911 reporting that a young white male intruder had entered their homes and attacked them while asleep in bed.  Each victim’s description of the intruder was generally the same.

During the second attack, the victim struggled with the intruder and was able to pull the T-shirt from his body.  The intruder fled leaving the t-shirt…a black crew neck…behind.  While police secured a perimeter around the area of the burglaries and conducted a manhunt, several residents observed a young white, shirtless male with jean-shorts and plaid boxers running around the neighborhood.  One witness in particular saw appellant run through his yard and enter a home nearby.

The State conducted a DNA analysis of the black t-shirt recovered at the second victim’s house. The State’s DNA expert testified that the DNA profile generated from the T-shirt showed a mixture of DNA from two or more individuals, but with the “predominate profile” in the mixture matching the known DNA sample taken from appellant. The State’s expert estimated the probability of a random person’s DNA profile matching the predominate profile found on the shirt at one in 58 trillion. Appellant’s DNA expert interpreted the same data and concluded that the probability of a random match was one in 644,000.

Furthermore, on the same morning of the burglaries, officers confronted appellant at work and noticed fresh scratches and bruises.

The State charged appellant with three counts of first-degree burglary.  The jury found appellant guilty of one count of first-degree burglary for the incident involving the victim who ripped the shirt off of the intruder but failed to reach a verdict on the two counts relating to the other burglary incidents. Appellant was sentenced to 48 months in prison. The court of appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction, concluding that that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction for burglary.  The appellant appealed based on insufficient evidence.

A conviction based on circumstantial evidence receives stricter scrutiny than a conviction based on direct evidence. In addition to the analysis the court applies in direct evidence cases, the court also considers whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved support a rational hypothesis other than guilt. “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.”

After a thorough 15-page analysis, the court affirmed the conviction based on circumstantial evidence.

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

State of Minnesota v. Terry McDevitt

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant was convicted of fifth degree possession of a controlled substance and sought to suppress evidence of the cocaine found in is sock arguing that the stop of his vehicle and warrantless arrest violated his constitutional rights.  The district court denied his motion and found him guilty.  Court of appeals affirmed.

Law enforcement had obtained a search warrant for Edward Mack, a known drug dealer.  Before executing the warrant, officers met in the parking lot of a Menard’s in Fridley.  Coincidentally and to their surprise, officers observed Mack enter the same Menard’s parking lot driving the same vehicle identified in the warrant.  Mack parked his vehicle towards the back of the lot.  Shortly thereafter, police watched as a silver sedan drove to Mack’s car and stopped next to it.  The silver sedan was driven by a female and appellant occupied the passenger seat.  Appellant exited the silver sedan and entered Mack’s car.  Officer’s observed appellant remain in Mack’s car for approximately 30 seconds, exited and returned to the silver sedan and drove off.  Officers executed the warrant on Mack and, suspecting a drug transaction had occurred involving appellant, initiated a stop of the silver sedan.

The officer ordered McDevitt out, immediately handcuffed him, and directed him to the ground. He pat-searched McDevitt for weapons but found none. He told McDevitt that Mack was the subject of a cocaine-dealing investigation. McDevitt denied having any cocaine. The officer left McDevitt on the ground and ordered the driver from the car. He asked her if there was crack cocaine in the car, and she immediately disclosed that McDevitt had just purchased three to four “pills” of crack cocaine.

The officer began searching the silver sedan, but McDevitt interrupted and said that he had the crack cocaine hidden in his left sock. The officer searched McDevitt’s sock and found the cocaine.

McDevitt moved the district court to suppress the evidence of his initial statement to the officer that he did not have any cocaine, his statement to the officer that the cocaine was in his sock, and the crack cocaine found in his sock. He based his motion on his assertion that police lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify stopping his car or a particularized, objective basis justifying his immediate arrest.

The court was not persuaded.

A police officer may stop a person to investigate if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Whether police have a reasonable suspicion to stop depends on the totality of the circumstances.

The court reasoned that officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory stop of McDevitt’s vehicle. Officers watched a suspected drug dealer under investigation stop in a large commercial parking lot far from the store entrance in a vehicle that he had driven to three recent controlled buys and that was subject to an active search warrant for drugs. The officers considered the suspicious circumstances: McDevitt’s car stopped next to the drug dealer’s car, McDevitt entered the drug dealer’s car, McDevitt reached down toward the floor, and McDevitt returned to his car after less than one minute. Also, despite the retail location of the encounter, McDevitt demonstrated no interest in legitimate shopping.  The detectives reasonably suspected that McDevitt might have just made a drug transaction.

Because police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the investigatory stop of McDevitt’s car did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

State of Minnesota v. Sam Ulland

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant plead guilty to public nuisance stemming from his failure to fix a damaged roof.  On July 15, 2008, appellant pleaded guilty to the nuisance charge, following his discussion with the prosecutor and the district court judge and after a discussion on the record about appellant’s rights. The court accepted the plea but decided to withhold sentencing for 45 days to allow appellant to fix his roof and abate the underlying public nuisance.

On August 29, 2008, the court stayed imposition of a sentence and also stayed eight of ten days of the probationary jail time so long as appellant paid a fine and finished his roof repairs, both by September 19. On September 19 appellant reported that his repairs remained incomplete, and he moved to withdraw his plea. Finding no manifest injustice requiring otherwise, the court denied the withdrawal motion.

A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once it is entered. In order to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing, a defendant must establish that withdrawal is necessary to correct a “manifest injustice.”

Appellant claimed that his plea was coerced by an “off the record” statement that the judge made to him.  Finding no proof that the statement had been made, the court ruled that no manifest injustice had occurred the court denied the withdrawal motion.

State of Minnesota v. Joshua McMillen

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Here, the court addresses another motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this time on the grounds that the plea was not made intelligently.

Defendant pleaded guilty to third degree criminal sexual conduct.  During the plea hearing, appellant’s counsel stated that appellant agreed to “abide by all predatory offender registration requirements … as required by Minnesota statute.” Appellant further acknowledged on the record that he (1) understood the terms of the agreement, (2) had sufficient time to discuss his case with his attorney, (3) was satisfied with his representation, (4) had thoroughly read the petition to enter a guilty plea, (5) had the opportunity to ask questions, and (6) wished to proceed with the plea. Attached to appellant’s plea petition was a settlement offer. One of the agreed-to provisions stated that appellant would “abide by all predatory offender registration requirements.”  Specifically appellant had a lifetime duty to register as a sex offender.

At sentencing, appellant sought to withdraw his plea based on his claim that his lawyer advised that he would have to register as a sex offender for ten years rather than for the lifetime requirement.  Appellant stated that had he known the registry requirement was for life, he never would have pleaded guilty. 

The court denied his motion to withdraw reasoning that the purpose of the requirement that the plea be intelligent is to ensure that the defendant understands the charges, understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty, and understands the consequences of his plea.  But the defendant need only be aware of the direct consequences of a plea for it to be intelligent. Direct consequences are those which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea, namely, the maximum sentence to be imposed and the amount of any fine.  Ignorance of a collateral consequence does not entitle a criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea.

State of Minnesota v. James Willette

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant was charged with theft arising out of stealing guns from his landlord.  At his bail hearing, and after appellant was informed of his rights to which appellant acknowledged that he understood, appellant made an unsolicited confession to taking his landlord’s guns without his permission.  Appellant sought to suppress the confession but the district court denied the motion reasoning that his statement was voluntary he had already been informed of his rights to which he understood.  Appellant was convicted and followed with an appeal.

The district court proceeded to set bail with conditions. The county attorney argued that bail be set at $25,000 based on Willette’s being a flight risk and a threat to public safety. The district court then asked Willette whether he “wish[ed] to comment on the issue of bail or release conditions.” Willette responded much broader than those issues, confessing to the theft:

Yes, Your Honor. These weapons were not used in the commission of a crime. I needed some money to pay bills, and I was living with the individual at the time. And, yes, I did take them without his permission, but I just took them to the pawn shop, Your Honor. They were not used in a crime. I do have family in Pine City. I have an ex-wife and two daughters…. I’m not a threat to the public. Like I said, they were not used in a crime. They were only taken to the pawn shop to pay some bills. And so I would ask that that be taken into consideration of bail…. I do have roots in this community. I would appear.

The district court set bail at $25,000.

Willette argues that his confession should have been suppressed under the Sixth Amendment because the district court’s decision to have a contested bail hearing forced him to represent himself at a critical stage of the prosecution. The court disagreed. Generally, the remedy when evidence is obtained in violation of the Constitution is exclusion of that evidence at a future trial. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the “assistance of counsel for his defense.” The right to counsel attaches at the defendant’s initial appearance.

After the right to counsel has attached, the defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of prosecution.   Although the right to counsel attaches at a defendant’s initial appearance, the defendant does not have the right to counsel at a hearing in which the sole purpose is to fix bail and appoint an attorney. Willette’s initial appearance was a hearing for the sole purpose of fixing bail and appointing counsel. Willette therefore did not have a right to counsel at his initial appearance.

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• 2 DWIs in 10 years: mandatory minimum sentence is 30 days incarceration, $900 fine.
• 3 DWIs in 10 years: mandatory minimum sentence is 90 days incarceration, $900 fine.
• 4 DWIs in 10 years: mandatory minimum sentence is 180 days of incarceration,$4200 fine.
• 5 DWIs in 10 years: mandatory minimum sentence is one year of incarceration, $4200 fine.

Don’t just give in, plead guilty, and allow a judge to sentence you with these severe sentences as a minimum. Hire an experienced Minnesota DWI attorney to defend your rights and prevent a DWI from ruining your life.

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State of Minnesota v. Bernard Connie

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant challenged his conviction of fifth-degree controlled-substance sale, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress a pistol and marijuana that officers discovered during a search of appellant. The district court held that the search was lawful, relying on the consent and search-incident-to-arrest exceptions to the warrant requirement. Because the state did not meet its burden of establishing that appellant’s consent was voluntary and because the search was not a valid search incident to arrest, the court held that the search was illegal. The court reversed and remanded.

Officers observed Connie and three other males “loitering” on a street corner in Minneapolis.  Officers parked their unmarked squad car approximately one block away and observed what appeared to be a drug transaction between Connie and another male.  Officers approached the males shortly thereafter with weapons drawn and ordered them to put their hands in the air.

After Connie complied, Blackmon asked Connie for permission to search him for “guns, knives [or] drugs.” Connie replied “yes,” and he told the officer that he was carrying a pistol in his waistband and claimed he had a permit to carry the firearm.

The officer reached into Connie’s waistband and removed the firearm. He then handcuffed Connie and told him he was under arrest. The officer continued to search Connie and discovered cash and five baggies of marijuana during the process. Connie was subsequently charged with fifth-degree controlled-substance crime.

Connie moved to suppress the firearm and marijuana on the grounds that the search violated his Fourth Amendment constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The district court denied the motion and Connie was subsequently convicted and later appealed.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit the unreasonable search and seizure of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to limited exceptions.  To justify a warrantless search based on consent, the state must prove that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. Consent must be received, not extracted.

In the analysis, the court considered the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the giving of consent in this case which led the court to conclude the state did not satisfy its burden of proving that Connie’s consent was voluntary. The court observed that Connie was standing on a street corner when, without warning, four law-enforcement officers pulled up to the corner and exited their vehicle with guns drawn. They identified themselves as police officers and instructed Connie and his companions to put their hands up in the air. An officer then directed Connie to turn away from the officer and to place his hands on a fence. As Connie stood with his back to the officer and with his hands up against the fence, the officer asked to search Connie for “guns, knives or drugs.” The court concluded that a reasonable person would not have felt free to decline the officer’s request or to otherwise terminate this encounter. The court further concluded that the officer’s immediately ensuing request for Connie’s consent to a search was not severable or distinguishable from the multiple commands that preceded it. The court was not persuaded that the facts that the officer had holstered his gun and used “a calm voice” eliminated the coercive nature of the encounter.

State of Minnesota  v. Bobby Vang

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant challenges his conviction of felony firearm possession by an ineligible person, arguing that the district court should have suppressed the evidence as the product of an illegal search and seizure. Because the search of the car that resulted in the discovery of the firearm was supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion, the court affirms

Vang was the passenger seated in the backseat behind the driver.  As officers in a marked squad car passed the vehicle driving in the opposite direction, the driver raised his left arm and shielded his face with his hand.  Officers found that behavior suspicious and turned to follow the vehicle.  As the squad turned, the vehicle made an abrupt turn without signaling.  The officers initiated a stop and the vehicle pulled over immediately.  Officers ran the license plate and found the registered owner to be a gang member with a violent history.  As officers approached the vehicle they observed Vang make “unusual leaning movement to his right” as if he were “digging behind his back with his left arm.”  Officers ordered all four occupants to exit the vehicle.  Upon searching the vehicle officers found a handgun behind the seat where Vang was seated.  Vang was charged with felony possession of a firearm by an ineligible person.  He was sentenced to 36 months in prison.

Appellant argues that the search of the vehicle in which he was a passenger, and the seizure of his gun, violated his rights under both constitutions, and that the district court was therefore required to suppress the gun as evidence in the state’s case against him.

Although U.S. Supreme Court cases have cast doubt on whether the Fourth Amendment still requires reasonableness under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), during a “very minor” traffic stop when the stop is supported by probable cause, the Minnesota Constitution independently requires that the Terry framework be used to evaluate “the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated.”

After an exhaustive analysis of Terry, the court affirmed the conviction reasoning that Vang made “suspicious movements” as they approached the vehicle.  The driver as well, by shielding his face.  Further, the court found that the driver’s gang affiliation as well as Vang’s clothing matched that typically worn by Crips gang members as relevant.  Finally, the stop occurred in a high crime area raising officer’s suspicion.  The court reasoned that although no single act may be sufficient alone, a Terry analysis considers the “totality of the circumstances.”  Vang’s conviction affirmed.

State of Minnesota v. Antonio Collins

UNPUBLISHED OPINION            

On appeal from his conviction of third-degree controlled substance crime, appellant argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by inflaming the passion and prejudices of the jury during closing argument. The court affirms.

Appellant objected to the following remark made by the prosecutor in his closing statement:

“Dealing with what this case is about from the police perspective, it must be–seem like an insurmountable difficult task at times to try to have a significant impact on street-level drug dealing, to be able to feel like they can make a significant dent in that particular problem.”

For prosecutorial misconduct that is objected to at trial, the standard of review varies based on the severity of the perceived misconduct.” If the misconduct is less serious, the court determines whether it “likely played a substantial part” in influencing the jury. Although appellant concedes that the alleged misconduct is “somewhat less serious,” he contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the alleged misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict him.

The court affirmed the conviction reasoning that “when viewed as a whole” it is unlikely that the prosecutor’s statements inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury. See Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 208 (stating that the reviewing court considers the prosecutor’s closing argument as a whole and does not focus on selected phrases taken out of context).

State of Minnesota v. Stanton Williams

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant challenges his first-degree aggravated robbery conviction, arguing that, among other issues, the district court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense.

Appellant Stanton Williams was convicted of first-degree aggravated robbery. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on fifth-degree assault. Failure to give a lesser-included-offense instruction is grounds for reversal if the defendant is prejudiced. Prejudice exists when there was a rational basis to convict on the lesser offense and acquit on the greater offense.

In considering whether to give a lesser-included-offense instruction, the district court must determine whether (1) the offense is a lesser-included, (2) the evidence provides a rational basis for a conviction on the lesser offense, and (3) the evidence provides a rational basis for an acquittal on the greater offense. A lesser offense is included if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without committing the lesser. In determining whether an offense is a lesser-included, the court looks at the elements of the offense, not the facts of the particular case. If the offense is a lesser-included, the court must then determine whether the evidence provides a rational basis for a conviction on the lesser offense and an acquittal on the greater offense.

Because fifth-degree assault is a lesser-included offense of simple robbery, and simple robbery is a lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated robbery, fifth-degree assault is a lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated robbery. The next step is to determine whether the evidence provides a rational basis for a conviction on the lesser offense and an acquittal on the greater.

While at a barbeque, appallant asked to speak with the victim, and when the men went outside, appellant immediately punched him in the face.  The victim fell to the ground, and whiule others continued the attack, appellant reached into the victims pocket and pulled out victim’s money and cell phone.

Appellant argued that there was a rational basis for the jury to acquit on the first-degree aggravated-robbery charge because there were no eyewitnesses and the allegedly stolen items were never recovered. However, the court disagreed reasoning that even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, the evidence does not provide a rational basis for an acquittal on first-degree aggravated robbery as the victim testified that he had been robbed.

Related posts:

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2. Minnesota Criminal Caselaw Update for the Week of November 30 – December 4, 2009
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David Lee Lasse v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe

The Minnesota Supreme Court rules that the “innocent owner defense” in Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d) (2008), does not apply in a case of joint ownership of a vehicle if one of the joint owners is also the offender causing forfeiture of the vehicle. 

On May 16, 2006 Mr. Lasse finished a round of golf during the day and met his wife at the golf club later in the evening.  Mr. Lasse was on his way home while Mrs. Lasse had planned to play a round of evening golf.  Mr. Lasse testified that he never saw his wife hold a drink nor did he suspect that she had been drinking at all.  During the early morning hours of May 17, Mrs. Lasse was charged with DWI.  She subsequently plead guilty to second degree test refusal thereby triggering seizure of the vehicle.

Mr. Lasse challenged the seizure by filing the demand for judicial determination.  After a hearing, the district court concluded that the vehicle was not subject to forfeiture because Mr. Laase demonstrated that he was an “innocent owner.”  The County appealed and the district court granted the County’s motion to stay its order directing that the vehicle be returned to Mr. Laase pending appeal. The court of appeals affirmed.

The question presented in this case is whether the “innocent owner” defense provided for in Minnesota’s vehicle forfeiture statute, Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d), applies to prevent forfeiture of the Lasses’ vehicle under this defense:

A motor vehicle is not subject to forfeiture under this section if its owner can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the owner did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle would be used or operated in any manner contrary to law or that the owner took reasonable steps to prevent the use of the vehicle by the offender.

The parties appear to agree that the “innocent owner” defense in the vehicle forfeiture statute is unambiguous. The parties disagree, however, over whether all owners of the vehicle must be innocent in order for the defense to apply. The statute is written in the singular, providing that the defense is available if the vehicle’s “owner” demonstrates innocence. But the County contends that we should rely on the canon in which the legislature has stated that the “singular includes the plural.”  With “owner” construed as “owners” in subdivision 7(d), the County argues it is clear that the defense does not apply to this case because both “owners” were not innocent.

Despite the opinions of three dissenting Justices, the Supreme Court reversed and the vehicle was forfeited.

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

State of Minnesota  v. August Leroy Kihlgren

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Kihlgren appeals his conviction of first degree sexual misconduct on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct arguing that the prosecutor disparaged his defense theory during closing argument.  The court affirmed his conviction.

The court will not reverse based on prosecutorial misconduct if the misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mayhorn. 720 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Minn.2006). An error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt only if the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error.”

Appellant’s defense theory involved characterizing the victims injuries as minimal and inconsistent with sexual assault. He argues that the prosecutor mocked this theory by stating “apparently the victim wasn’t beaten well enough for appellant’s counsel’s liking.”

The district court sustained appellant’s objections to these statements. But they represented just two lines in the prosecutor’s four-page argument and were a direct response to appellant’s characterization of the victims injuries. Considered in the context of the entire closing argument, the court ruled that the statements did not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct nor did they prejudice appellant.

State of Minnesota v. Naser Omer Ali

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Ali was convicted of possessing cathinone, a Schedule I controlled substance found in “khat,” a plant grown in Africa.  The basis of Ali’s appeal was that he did not know that the substance in his possession, khat, contained cathinone.

From June 2005 to March 2006 Ali received multiple shipments via FedEx of khat.  Each shipment contained 4 to 17 pounds of the substance for a total amount of 140 pounds.  The khat had an estimated street value of $13,000.  Ali contends that he had no knowledge that the khat contained cathinone.

The operative statute provides that “[a] person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the fifth degree if … the person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures containing a controlled substance classified in schedule I, II, III, or IV.”   Possession crimes require proof that the defendant “had actual knowledge of the nature of the substance” in his possession.

Ali argues that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that he knew that his khat contained cathinone. The state responds that Ali’s conduct shows that he knew he possessed an illegal controlled substance.

“The law is settled that a defendant need not know the exact nature of a drug in his possession to violate, it is sufficient that he be aware that he possesses some controlled substance.”  United States v. Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 439 (6th Cir.2003) “Drug type and quantity are irrelevant to the mens rea element of which requires nothing more specific than an intent to distribute a controlled substance.”United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2002)

Consistent with this precedent from other states and the overwhelming majority of federal circuits, the court held that when a defendant is prosecuted for possessing cathinone-containing khat, proof that the defendant was aware that he possessed a controlled substance satisfies the statute’s actual-knowledge requirement.

State of Minnesota v. Catherine McQueen

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeallant entered a guilty plea to third degree DWI and sentenced to 15 days house arrest in Anoka County District Court.  McQueen later attempted to withdraw her guilty plea because she felt dizzy and ill and feared the onset of a seizure.  The denied withdrawal of the plea and upheld the conviction.

A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once it is entered. But Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, provides that any time before or after sentencing, a court shall allow withdrawal of a guilty plea “upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” A manifest injustice exists where the plea was not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. The voluntariness requirement insures that the guilty plea is not in response to improper pressures or inducements; and the intelligent requirement insures that the defendant understands the charges, his or her rights under the law, and the consequences of pleading guilty.  Withdrawal is not warranted if the defendant understood the nature and seriousness of the offense charged at the time of pleading.

Upon review of the record the court concluded that McQueen’s plea was voluntariy and intelligent and affirmed her conviction.

State of Minnesota v. Sadi Muhamed Gure

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Gure was convicted of first degree DWI and appeals his conviction based on insufficient evidence to support the conviction.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

At trial, the State’s only witness was the arresting officer.  The officer testified that upon receiving information from dispatch of a possible impaired driver, he located a vehicle matching the description.  He observed the vehicle swerve over the both fog lines and make an abrupt lane change.  After failing field sobriety test and refusing to submit to a preliminary breath test, Gure was arrested and taken to the police station.

Upon arrival, Gure apparently fell asleep.  Officer’s were unable to rouse Gure and subsequently had him taken to the hospital.  Because of thse circumstances, officers were unable to obtain a blood, breath or urine test. 

Appellant argues that this evidence is circumstantial in nature and that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant’s behavior and failure of field sobriety tests were due to alcohol impairment and not some other cause. But an individual can be convicted of driving while impaired by the testimony of an arresting officer alone. See State v. Waterston, 371 N.W.2d 650, 651-52 (Minn.App.1985).

State of Minnesota v. Breanna Vesaas

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Vesaas appeals her third degree DWI conviction also on the basis of insufficient evidence.  Vesaas argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the guilty verdict because the state provided no expert testimony that the Intoxilyzer or its results were reliable or accurate.

The court affirmed her conviction reasoning:

“[T]he results of a breath test, when performed by a person who has been fully trained in the use of an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument … are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument provides a trustworthy and reliable measure of the alcohol in the breath.” Minn.Stat. § 634.16 (2006). The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for a DWI conviction does not require any particular type of evidence and does not require expert testimony on the reliability of the Intoxilyzer. State v. Birk, 687 N.W.2d 634, 638-39 (Minn.App.2004). Here, the test was performed by the police officer, a certified Intoxilyzer operator, in accordance with standard BCA testing procedure. This is sufficient to negate the need for expert testimony on the reliability of the test results.

Related posts:

1. Minnesota Criminal Caselaw Update for the Week of November 23 – 27, 2009
2. Minnesota Criminal Caselaw Update for the Week of December 7-11, 2009
3. Minnesota Criminal Caselaw for the Week of December 21-25, 2009

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1. Minnesota DWI Laws: Guilty Until Proven Innocent