SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

State of Minnesota  v. Danna Back

Appellant’s second degree manslaughter conviction is reversed by the Supreme Court on grounds that the evidence used to convict was insufficient.

The case involves an apparent love triangle involving Danna Back, Nicholas Super, and the murder victim, Daniel Holliday.  Super was the gunman who murdered Holliday at his home early New Year’s Day, 2007.  Back, who at one time had dated both Super and Holliday, was present at the time of the murder.  Back and Holliday owned a home together for several years prior to the murder.  At some point during the on and off again relationship Back had dated Super.  Back was aware that there was tension between Super and Holliday.  Super had threatened Holliday with a gun in the past, in fact, at one time had fired shots into Holliday’s garage when Back was at Holliday’s house.

On the night of the murder, Holliday was celebrating the New Year with friends at his house.  Back had spoken to Holliday on the phone and was angered after hearing female voices in the background.  Back called several friends for a ride to his house.  Unable to find a ride, she called Super.  He agreed to drive her to Holliday’s house and drop her off.  Rather than drop her off and leave, Super remained behind the house in the alley.

Back and Holliday had an argument inside the house.  As Holliday was removing Back from the house, he and Super had a confrontation and Super shot and killed Holliday. The jury subsequently found Back guilty of second-degree manslaughter based on culpable negligence.  The indictment charged Back with murder based on her “acting alone or intentionally aiding, advising, hiring, counseling or conspiring with” Super.

The jury found Back guilty of second-degree manslaughter under Minn.Stat. § 609.205(1), based on her culpable negligence. Under the statute, a person is guilty of manslaughter if she “causes the death of another … (1) by the person’s culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to another.” Minn.Stat. § 609.205(1). “Culpable negligence” is “more than ordinary negligence” and “more than gross negligence.”

A defendant cannot be negligent, culpably or otherwise, unless the defendant has a duty that he or she breached.

Under common law principles, there is generally no duty to protect strangers from the criminal actions of a third party. Ordinarily, there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless a special relationship exists, either between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty to control, or between the actor and the other which gives the other the right to protection.

The State made no argument that there was a relationship that would support the existence of a legal duty. Rather, in arguing that Back was culpably negligent, the State focuses on the foreseeability portion of the negligence analysis. The State contends that because Back knew that Super would pull his gun on “anybody,” had previously threatened Holliday with a gun, and was jealous of her relationship with Holliday, it was foreseeable to Back that Super would shoot Holliday.

The State’s focus on foreseeability does not resolve the threshold question of Back’s duty. Because the State seeks to hold Back criminally responsible for the criminal action of a third party, Minnesota cases require that the State prove that Back had a special relationship with either Super or with Holliday that gave rise to a duty to control Super or to a duty to protect Holliday against the actions of Super. The court held that under the circumstances presented here Back did not have a duty to control Super or to protect Holliday from Super, and she therefore was not culpably negligent in failing to control Super’s criminal actions.

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

State of Minnesota  v. Larry Burt

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant challenges sufficiency of search warrant to show probable cause to believe that evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing would be found at his place of residence.  During the search, no evidence of meth was found.  Rather a firearm was found by police.  Burt was ineligible to possess a firearm and appeals the conviction based on insufficient search warrant.

Prior to the warrant being issued, a CRI alerted police Burt possessed items used to manufacture meth at his home.  Shortly thereafter, Burt was stopped and arrested for driving a stolen vehicle.  During a search of the vehicle, police found 5.08 grams of meth.  A search warrant was subsequently issued to search Burt’s residence where, again, no meth was found but police did find a firearm that Burt was ineligible to possess.

Appellant was charged with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. He moved to suppress the shotgun, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court concluded that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and denied appellant’s motion. The case was tried to a jury, which found appellant guilty as charged.

When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, the court may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing–or not suppressing–the evidence.” The court accepts the district court’s underlying factual determinations bearing on a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds unless they are clearly erroneous.

Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions require that a search warrant be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. In determining whether a warrant is supported by probable cause, the court gives great deference to the issuing court’s probable-cause determination. The court’s review is limited to ensuring “that the issuing judge had a ’substantial basis’ for concluding that probable cause existed.”

A substantial basis means a fair probability, “given the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the issuing judge, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information … that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place.” In reviewing the sufficiency of a search-warrant affidavit under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, “courts must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation.”

In the Matter of the Welfare of:  DEMF v. State of Minnesota

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant was convicted of misdemeanor theft and ordered to pay restitution to the victim totaling $495.  Appellant failed to pay and was adjudicated delinquent.  Appellant argues that the district court erred in requiring her to pay without considering her inability to pay.  Delinquency for failure to pay affirmed.

A district court has broad discretion to award restitution, but the record must provide a factual basis for the amount awarded by showing the nature and amount of the losses with reasonable specificity.

Here, at sentencing for the underlying theft, appellant did protest her ability to pay $495 restitution.  In response, the court said that it would re-address the issue of payment after a 90-day review hearing.  The district court showed that the court considered, but rejected, appellant’s argument that she was unable to pay restitution. At the 90-day hearing appellant had not demonstrated that she is prohibited from working or otherwise earning money, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to order restitution.

Related posts:

1. Minnesota Criminal Caselaw Update for the Week of November 23 – 27, 2009
2. Minnesota Criminal Caselaw for the Week of December 21-25, 2009
3. Minnesota Criminal Caselaw Update for the Week of December 14-18, 2009
4. Minnesota Criminal Caselaw Update for the Week of November 30 – December 4, 2009
5. Minnesota Criminal Case Law Update For Week of November 16-20, 2009